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ESTATE PLANNING AND THE 1954
REVENUE CODE
C. EDGAR KETTERING*

The new Internal Revenue Code adopted August 16, 1954, made
changes in estate tax, income tax and gift tax provisions, which
among other things, but to a limited degree, affect all types of
estate planning devices. Affected by the new law will be revocable
and irrevocable trusts, wills, insurance dispositions and joint tenancies.
Generally, the effective date of the new law as to income taxes
covers income commencing with the calendar year 1954; for estates, those dying after August 16, 1954, the date of enactment;
and for gifts, those made in 1955.
In the case of a revocable trust, on death of the settlor, the
assets of the trust although not a part of the probate estate, are
a part of the taxable estate and yet under the old law if the amount
of funeral expenses and claims exceeded the amount of the probate
estate (which, of course, could happen where all or most of a man's
property was in a living trust, or in joint tenancy) such excess
could not be deducted simply because it was not in the probate
estate: Now it can be deducted if such claims are paid within the
fifteen months allowed for filing the Tax Return. In addition, it
allows as a deduction amounts expended in administering property
not subject to claims, provided the claims are paid within the fifteen months. This would include commissions paid with respect to
trust property included in the gross estate and attorney's fees paid
in contesting matters with respect thereto.
INCOME TAX: The Clifford Regulations with some changes
are now codified in the new Code. These Code sections deal generally with determining when income from certain assets will be
taxable to the grantor in spite of the fact that he has transferred
them to a trust which is irrevocable. This is, of course, a very important consideration in establishing such trust because in nearly
every case of an irrevocable living trust the purpose of creating
it is to save both income taxes and estate taxes.
Here are five situations in which the income of the trust is
still taxable to the grantor even though he has transferred the
assets producing such income to an irrevocable trust. (Here we
are reminded that the only type of trust which can possibly result
in lessening the income tax of the grantor is an irrevocable trust as
distinguished from a revocable trust).
1. Section 673 provides that when a trust is for a term of
ten years or less, with the corpus or income then reverting to the
grantor, the income is taxable to the grantor and not the Trustee
or the beneficiaries of the trust. (Under the Clifford Regulations
* Of the Denver Bar.
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this period was fifteen years if the grantor or his wife possessed
certain administrative powers). There are exceptions to this rule,
(a) where the trust is for the benefit of qualified charities, and,
(b) where the reversionary interest of the grantor is to take effect
upon the death of the person or persons to whom the income is
payable even though such person may have a life expectancy of less
than ten years. The Code definitely settles what was not too definite under the Clifford Regulations, viz, that reversion of a trust to
the settlor any time after ten years, will not cause the income to be
taxable to him during the ten year period.
2. Section 674 provides that regardless of the duration of the
trust (here we are no longer speaking of short term, ten year
trusts), the income will be taxable to the grantor, if the beneficial
enjoyment of the trust corpus or income is subject to a power of disposition, or discretion, by the grantor or a non-adverse party, or
both, without the approval of an adverse party. (An adverse party
is one having "a substantial beneficial interest" which would be adversely affected by the exercise or non-exercise of such power).
Thus if the grantor retains the right to direct the trustee (or if the
grantor retains such right as trustee himself) during the pendency
of a trust, to make discretionary payments to various beneficiaries,
then the income of the entire trust will be taxable to such grantor.
This rule as above stated would deprive trusts of one of their
greatest advantages (aside from tax considerations), viz, the power
of a trustee who is not an adverse party (which is the usual situation) to distribute income or corpus among several beneficiaries
according to their needs, and as the unforeseeable future may make
and change those needs.
There are a few exceptions to this rule which are worth
noting:
First. A grantor may retain control over discretionary distributions, and still not be taxed with the income of the Trusts, by
retaining the right to appoint by his will (other than income accumulated in his lifetime).
Second. He (or a non-adverse party) may retain a power to
distribute corpus, if such power is limited by "a reasonably definite
standard", set forth in the Trust instrument, such as "for educational purposes".
Third. A power may be retained over income during legal
disability or during the minority of certain beneficiaries.
There are certain other exceptions to the rule which are quite
restrictive in their application.
There is an important exception to the rule also which permits
giving a trustee or trustees (other than the grantor) power to distribute, apportion or accumulate corpus or income to or among
beneficiaries, or within a class of beneficiaries, in the sole discretion
of the trustee, provided that nomore than one-half the trustees can
be related or subservient to the grantor's wishes, as defined in the
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Code. This makes it possible for Trust Companies and Banks to
continue their magnificent services to the community by protecting
widows from the evil designs of unscrupulous villians and second
husbands, and shielding wayward sons and innocent daughters
from their own weaknesses and extravagances in a wicked and
scheming world after father's protective arm is removed.
3. Section 675 sets forth administrative powers, which when
exercisable by an non-adverse party, will cause the income of the
trust to be taxable to the grantor. Generally, these powers are as
follows: (1) a power enabling the grantor or any person to deal
with the property for less than a adequate consideration, (2) a
power which enables the grantor to borrow directly or indirectly
without adequate interest or security, (3) a situation where the
grantor has actually borrowed from the trust on a loan without
adequate interest and security, and has not repaid the loan before
the beginning of the taxable year, (4) a power of administration
as in this section defined, exercised in a non-fiduciary capacity by
any person without the approval or consent of any person in a
fiduciary capacity.
4. Section 676 provides the grantor shall be taxed with the
income, if he or a non-adverse party, or both have the power to
revoke the trust and revest it in the grantor. Of course, we are
considering irrevocable trusts, so if this. power exists the trust is
not irrevocable.
5. Section 677-This is the well known rule that the grantor
of an irrevocable trust will be taxed with the income, if the income
(without the approval of an adverse party) may in the discretion
of the grantor or any non-adverse party, or both, be
(a) Distributed to grantor or accumulated for him, or,
(b) Applied to insurance premiums on his life (except
where proceeds used for certain charities).
An important exception-Income is not taxable to grantor.
merely because in trustees (or grantor's) discretion, it may be used
for "support or maintenance" of a beneficiary whom grantor is
legally obligated to support except to the extent such income is so
applied or distributed. The above considerations had to do with
the effect on grantor's income tax by retention or granting certain
powers. Now we consider estate tax consequences.
It may turn out that the reservation by the grantor of some
of the powers above discussed, even though not causing the grantor
to be taxable with the income, may under the estate tax provisions
cause the trust to be includable in his gross estate. Briefly, the provisions covering a situation wherein irrevocable trust will be taxable to the grantor's estate are as follows:
1. Where the trust is set up in contemplation of death
2. Where the grantor reserves the power to amend, revoke or alter the trust alone or with any person
(whether or not adverse)
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3. Where the grantor makes a reservation of the income
(here also the grantor would be taxable with the income)
4. A transfer which is considered to take effect at or
after the death of the grantor
The new Code made only one substantial change in these
provisions, which affects the provisions governing transfers to
take effect at or after death. Before 1954, transfers were divided
into two classes, pre October 1949 transfers and post October 1949
transfers. A transfer prior to October 1949 was considered as a
transfer intended to take effect at or after death and therefore
includable in the grantor's estate, if (1) the beneficiary had to
survive the decedent and the decedent possessed any interest or
right in the property, such as a possibility of reverter. Transfers
after October 7, 1949 were considered as taxable under this section,
if the beneficiary had to survive to possess or enjoy the property
or if the grantor possessed an interest in the property. Therefore,
on transfers after October 1949 and prior to the 1954 code, the
government had a two-pronged device for holding the assets taxable
in the grantor's estate. The 1954 Code has softened this area and
has put the taxability generally on the same basis that existed prior
to October 1949. Under the provisions of Section 2037 the transfer
in trust or otherwise is nbt considered as taking effect at or after
death unless the beneficiary must survive to enjoy the property and
the decedent retained a reversionary interest which, immediately
before death of the decent, exceeded 5% of the value of the trust.
Therefore, in setting up an irrevocable trust, it is always advisable
to avoid any possibility of reverter to the grantor by naming enough
contingent beneficiaries, or by providing for an ultimate disposition
to charity in the event all beneficiaries die before enjoying the
property.
GIFT TAX (To Minors) : A very important change has been
made under the gift tax provisions of Section 2503 regarding irrevocable gifts in trust for the benefit of minors. Prior to the 1954
Code a transfer in trust for the benefit of a minor providing for
accumulations until the minor became of age constituted a gift of
a future interest and therefore the annual $3000 exclusion was not
available. The new Code provides that a gift in trust for a minor
shall be considered as a gift of a present interest, and therefore
makes available the $3000 annual exclusion, if the corpus and income may be expended for the benefit of the minor before attaining
twenty-one, and if not so expended will pass to the minor at majority, and if he dies before reaching the age of twenty-one, then to
his estate or as he may appoint by a general power of appointment.
Thus for the first time, husband and wife seeking to reduce the
size of their estates, for death tax purposes, can place periodic
gifts of $6000 a year in trust for each minor child, which can accumulate the income until each child attains twenty-one years.
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without incurring a gift tax or using any of their $30,000 lifetime
exemptions. This law doesn't take effect until January 1, 1955.
LIFE INSURANCE: No lawyer can ignore the importance of life
insurance in planning an estate because (1) it is so widely held, (2)
because in amount it frequently represents a large part of the
estate, and (3) because it so often plays an important part in fixing
the amount of the estate tax, and it must also be considered in the
income tax picture of the beneficiary.
First, the income tax considerations. Under the old law, there
was no income tax assessed against a beneficiary on payment of
life insurance on the death of the insured. This is unchanged.
'Neither were instalment payments taxed even though a part of
such payments represented interest earned on the principal sum of
the policy. This has been changed by the new law so that the income portion of the instalment payments to the beneficiary (computed on a formula basis) is to be included in the beneficiary's income, except that a beneficiary who is the spouse of the insured
has a $1000 annual exemption with respect to such income portion.
This rule applies only where the death of insured occurred after the
enactment of the Code, August 16, 1954, so that existing payment
plans are not affected.
Next, there is an important change in the estate tax provisions with respect to insurance proceeds payable by reason of
death (Section 2042). The old law is unchanged that insurance
payable to the decedent's estate is taxable in his estate. Prior to the
1954 Code, insurance on the life of a decedent, even though paid
directly to a beneficiary, was also taxable in his estate, if (1) the
insured paid the premiums, or (2) he retained incidents of ownership. One or the other of these tests caught most insurance for
estate tax. Under the new section the premiums test has been
abandoned and the taxability is determined solely by the incidents
of ownership. If the insured had no incidents of ownership at the
time of his death, the insurance is no longer ordinarily taxed in his
estate, even though he has paid all the premiums. Incidents of ownership include the right to change the beneficiary, the power to
borrow on the policy, and the right to receive the cash surrender
value. Under the new Code, incidents of ownership also include a
''reversionary interest" (whether by express terms or operation of
law) if such value exceeds 5% of the value of the policy immemediately before the death of the insured.
Therefore, if insurance is now taken out on the husband's
life by the wife, giving her all the incidents of ownership, then on
the husband's death it will not be included in his gross estate even
though he pays all the premiums.
If the necessary gift tax were paid, existing insurance owned
by the husband could be transferred to the wife and he could continue paying the premiums.
This right of the husband to pay premiums on his life insur-
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ance without thereby including it in his estate is, of course, important, because in many, if not most cases, the only income available
for insurance premiums is that earned by the husband.
It will undoubtedly make insurance even more attractive in
estate planning; first, because a man contemplating a substantial
insurance program for the purpose of building up his estate need
not be deterred because he is paying the premiums by any consideration that he is thereby increasing his estate tax. In the second
place; one who is planning insurance purchases naming as beneficiary his wife or children, will be able to pay premiums up to
$6000 per year for each beneficiary, (using the marital deduction
in case of the wife and his wife's annual exclusion together with
his own in case of the childen) without paying any gift tax on
such premiums-again assuming that he does not retain incidents
of ownership.
JOINT TENANCY:

Two changes of importance, (1) respecting

cost basis, and (2) respecting gift taxes. Any changes affecting
joint tenancy are important because so much property is held in
joint tenancy.
(1) Cost Basis. Take the usual case-a husband buying real
or personal property with his funds, (say for $10,000), and putting
title in his and his wife's names in joint tenancy. He dies, and the
entire property will be included in his taxable estate at its date of
death (or optional date) value (let us say $20,000). Then the
widow sells the property for $20,000. What is her cost basis for
capital gain or loss purposes? Had she inherited it, or acquired it
by will, her cost would have been $20,000 under the old law. But,
if she acquired it by joint tenancy ownership, her cost would have
been her husband's cost of $10,000. Under the new law it is the
estate tax value ($20,000). So under the new law she will have
no capital gain. This new rule applies also to certain other values
included in the estate tax, e.g. property which is brought back into
the estate as having been transferred in contemplation of death
(provided the donee has not sold it before donor's death, in which
case its value would be the value as of the date of such sale). The
same rule also applies to property placed in a trust with income
reserved to grantor (which is taxed to the deceased as above noted).
In fact, any property will take a new date of death cost basis, if
acquired from a decedent by reason of death, form of ownership,
cr other conditions (including exercise or non-exercise of a power
of appointment) if by reason thereof the property is included in
the decendent's gross estate.
(2) Then there is an important gift tax change in joint tenancy
Under the old law if property was purchased in joint tenancy, and
one party contributed more than the other to the purchase price,
then a gift for gift tax purposes took place at the time of such
purchase. (This rule did not apply to survivor Government Bonds
or survivor bank accounts-and still does not).
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Under the new law, however, in the case only of joint tenancy
(a) real property, (b) ii the joint names of husband and wife, the
transaction will not involve a gift tax at that time for the spouse
furnishing the larger part, or all, of the purchase price, unless he
elects to so treat it. If he does not so elect, there will be a gift tax
when the joint ownership is ended (other than by death) unless
the spouses divided the proceeds proportionately to their contributions. Thus, husband and wife buy real estate, he contributing twothirds of purchase price, and she (from her separate property ) contributing one-third. There is no gift tax returned at the time of
such purchase. If they sell the property, there is still no gift if
they divide the proceeds two-thirds and one-third. There is a gift
tax on the difference if they divide on a different percentage basis.
It will be observed that the cost basis rule first discussed applied
to any joint tenancy ownership, whereas this gift tax rule applies
only to real estate in joint names of husband and wife.
Some changes have been made with respect to powers of appointment. Under the new 1954 Code, if a power of appointment is
includable in the decedent's estate, the beneficiary takes on a net
cost basis regardless of whether the power is exercised or not by
the decedent. The taxability of power of appointment is still determined on the same basis as under the 1939 Code, depending
primarily upon whether the power is a general or special power.
ACCUMULATED INCOME:

Generally, income accumulated in an

irrevocable living trust, or a testamentary trust, is (and was under
the old law) taxed to the trust and not to the beneficiary. Under
the new law, if income is accumulated after December 31, 1953,
and a distribution is made to the beneficiary in a later year in
excess of that year's distributable net income by $2000 or more,
the excess is taxed to him as income in the year in which it is distributed to him, but the amount of tax shall not exceed the amount
which would have been applicable had the income been paid him
in such prior years, even though that same income had been previously taxed to the trust up to the full amount of income which
had been accumulated over the preceding five years, starting with
the last preceding year. The beneficiary, however, gets a credit for
the tax previously paid by the trust.
There are several. important exceptions. First, if any annual
distribution to the beneficiary exceeds current distributable income by $2000 or less, such excess is not taxable to beneficiary
as income under this Throwback Rule. Thus, if distributions of
accumulated income are limited to $2000 in any year, the beneficiary need not treat such $2000 payment over that year's current
distributable income as taxable income. Second, the rule does not
apply to accumulations distributed during the minority of a beneficiary; and third, it does not apply when the distributions are
made to satisfy "emergency needs" of a beneficiary. This is an
important exception because most distributions over the current
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distributable income can be justified as an emergency, or they
wouldn't be made. Finally, the rule for taxing the past five years
of accumulations does not apply to amounts paid as a final distribution of the trust if made more than nine years after the date of
the transfer of property to such trust. Therefore, it is conceivable
that a father may set up a series of trusts providing for accumulation of income (taxable to the trustee) for nine years and one
day, ten years and one day, etc., thereby getting the income into
the hands of his son at the desirable intervals without incurring
additional tax liabilities, and the $2000 over-ride may be included
in this plan. In the case of an estate, it will no longer be possible
for an executor to make distributions within first sixty-five days
of the following year and have them treated as current distributions. They must be made by the end of the taxable year of the
estate. The Throwback Rule does not apply to estates in course
of administration.
Gifts or bequests of specific sums or specific property payable
all at once or in not more than three instalments are not considered
as accumulation distributions. For instance, if a beneficiary is to
receive $75,000 payable $25,000 at twenty-five years, $25,00 at
thirty, and $25,000 at thirty-five, and if the payments are not required to be made from income, those payments are not considered
as accumulation distributions.
The Code has also divided testamentary and irrevocable trusts
into two classifications, a simple trust and a complex trust.
A simple trust is one which is required to distribute all of
its income currently (but not to a charity) and will now receive
a $300 exemption. All other trusts are considered as complex and
receive only a $100 exemption as heretofore. The $300 exemption
may become important to offset capital gains taxable to the trustee
in small trusts.
Some changes have been made in the provisions governing
the marital deduction. Heretofore, the property given to the wife,
in order to qualify for the marital deduction, had to pass outright
to the wife, or be set up as a separate fund in a trust for her with
income for her life and the unrestricted power in her to dispose of
the property on her death. Now, in addition to the above, the husband may give his wife the life income from property (i.e. by a
legal life estate) with right to dispose of it on her death and without a trust, and it will qualify. I think the old trustee method will
still continue the most popular however.
There is another new addition to the marital deduction
methods which may develop popular usage. Now a husband can
set up one trust giving his wife the income from a certain percentage of the entire corpus, with a right to dispose of that same
percentage of the principal on her death. Her share of the trust
will now qualify for the marital deduction. This does not involve
segregating or ear-marking any specific assets out of the trust as
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hers. Her part of the trust could remain commingled with the
non-marital assets in the trust.
All other rules with respect to the marital deduction have
been retained. The requirements for qualification are still (1) the
property must be includable in the decedent's gross estate, (2)
the decedent must be a citizen or resident of the United States,
(3) the spouse must survive and the interest must pass or have
passed to the surviving spouse and must not be terminable in
nature.
RELIEF FROM SECOND ESTATE TAX.

The old Estate Tax law al-

lowed a deduction for property previously taxed within a five-year
period, but allowed no deduction where the property was received
from a husband or wife. Now there is a new method of computing
the credit; the period is increased from five years to ten years (but
on a sliding scale of credit) and a credit is now allowed for property left by one spouse to another to the extent the property did
not give the first estate a marital deduction. Thus, under the old
law, it might not pay for a husband to give his wife more than the
fifty percent which would qualify for the marital deduction, because if she died within the period there was no credit in her
estate for such overage. Now there would be a credit for it, and
there could well be situations which would warrant such provisions.
Under the old way a deduction was allowed for property actually
included in the decedent's estate upon which another person had
paid a gift tax on account of a gift to the decedent. Under the new
law no credit is allowed because of gift taxes paid by a person
other than the decedent on the transfer of property to the decedent
included in his gross estate.
The $50 fiat exclusion for dividends received applies to estates
and trusts, to the extent the dividends are not allocable to a
beneficiary.
Then four percent credit is also allowed on income received
after July 31, 1954 (but in 1954 it may not exceed 2% of 1954
taxable income).
REDEMPTION OF ESTATE STOCK:

In 1950 the law was amended

to permit redemption of stock by a corporation from an estate
without the proceeds being treated as a dividend to the estate for
income tax purposes, provided, (a) the amount of such redemption
did not exceed the death taxes in the estate, and, (b) the stock of
such corporation constituted more than 50% of the net estate. This
law was amended in 1951 to change the provision that the stock
constitute 50% of the net estate, to read that it must constitute at
least 35% of the gross estate of the deceased.
The new Code amends this provision to permit the same procedure in either event (viz, the corporate stock comprising 35%
of the gross estate, or 50% of the net estate) and equally important, increases the amount which may be thus redeemed without
income tax charged to the estate, to include not only death taxes
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but funeral and administrationexpenses as well. The law has certain other liberalizing provisions also. The result of this is that
where a decedent was the main, or, one of the main stockholders
in a close or family corpolation, and such corporation had built
up a surplus of undistributed profits, this is a means of distributing such profits on the death of such large stockholder without
incurring an income tax as for dividends paid, and can, therefore,
be a very important tax saving device. It might be stated that
Colorado adopted the old Federal law in 1953, using the test of
50% of the net estate, but limiting it as under the old Federal law
to the amount necessary for death taxes.

In January of this year the members of the Denver Bar Association approved the Bar Primary plan for the purpose of endorsing candidates for judicial office. Through this method it
was felt the best qualified candidates, based on experience, temperament, ability and integrity, would be selected. As a result of the
balloting the following ten men were endorsed for the nine vacancies on the District Court Bench:
William A. Black
Joseph E. Cook
Albert T. Frantz
Frank E. Hickey
Joseph M. McDonald
Robert H. McWilliams, Jr.
Floyd F. Miles
Robert W. Steele
Joseph J. Walsh
Charles E. Works
Mitchel B. Johns was endorsed for the Superior Court Bench.
Every lawyer, regardless of whether or not he resides in the
City and County of Denver, should make every effort to influence
as many voters as possible for the election of these candidates.
A well-qualified judiciary is the best method of safeguarding
the interests of the public.
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THE EXPERT WITNESS*
BERNARD C. SHERBOK, M.D.

It is estimated that there are approximately one and one-half
million auto accidents and two million industrial accidents annually in this country. These injuries afford ample opportunity
not only for doctors but also for lawyers who are interested to
engage in medical jurisprudence. For this reason, the subject
"The Role of the Expert Witness in the Preparation and Trial of
Tort Actions" is timely and is becoming increasingly important.
Courtesy in sending a subpoena to a doctor is an essential
point in fostering pleasant relationships between doctors and
lawyers. I do not have to tell you that most doctors are busy.
They arrange their time in advance. For example, the doctor
might have surgery scheduled as far as two or three weeks ahead.
The layman has no idea what scheduling an operation entails.
First, the operating room supervisor must be contacted for a specific day and time. If the doctor wants eight o'clock time, he may
have to schedule an operation two or three weeks, or even longer,
in advance. After he has scheduled operating time, an anesthetist
must be found. When these details are arranged, the doctor must
phone the hospital again and ask the admission clerk whether or
not a bed can be obtained the day before the operation is scheduled. Imagine the disruption that occurs when a subpoena from
an attorney arrives informing the doctor that he must appear in
court at 9 or 10 o'clock on that particular day. The attorney did
not ask the doctor whether or not he had any work scheduled on
that day. My plea is for the lawyer to be courteous and telephone
the doctor in advance, asking him whether or not he could arrange
his time to appear in court at a specified time and day. Furthermore, ofttimes a subpoena reads that the doctor must appear in
court at 10 o'clock on a certain day, when he may not be placed
on the witness stand until 3:30 the same afternoon or perhaps
even on the following morning. A courteous lawyer will avoid all
such delays and unpleasantness for the doctor.
In the eyes of the law any medical practitioner may be considered to be an expert witness, although he may not necessarily
be an expert or a specialist in his field. For practical purposes it
behooves the lawyer to qualify his medical witness. I am reminded of a case in which I testified some years ago in district
court. A general practitioner was testifying on a rare type of
fracture. After the medical testimony was completed, we left the
courtroom together and as we walked down the corridor, I queried
"How many of those fractures have you seen?" He answered,
"That's the only one I ever saw. I'm thankful they didn't ask me
how many I have seen!"
Some lawyers are hesitant in questioning doctors about their
* Address given at a Symposium on the "Preparation and Trial of Tort
Actions" held at the University of Colorado on Law Day, April 24, 1954.
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qualifications. Time after time, I have heard the opposing lawyer
say, "Doctor's qualifications accepted". The doctor was qualified
by law but the jury was not made aware of his qualifications. The
lawyer should impress the jury with these qualifications, particularly if the plaintiff's doctor is not as well versed in some branch
of medicine as the doctor for the defendant.
The doctor's pre-medical education should be stated, since
every layman has heard of some schools and not of others. Certain
schools have been ingrained in the public mind and a little more
respect might be engendered on the part of the jury. Ask the
name of the medical school which the doctor attended. Today all
medical schools are Class A. However, some schools carry higher
prestige in the minds of laymen.
The type and place of the internship could be stressed. During World War II doctors were required to serve only a nine
months internship. Prior to the war and again thereafter, a doctor was compelled to spend twelve months in order to fulfill an
acceptable internship. If he took a residency, this fact should also
be mentioned. A residency is considered to be advanced postgraduate training. The location of the residency, the type of work
and duration may be factors which could influence a jury.
The American Board has become an important factor, and
almost every specialist today is a diplomate. The American Board
is an examining body that has been established to certify men
who are qualified to practice as specialists. Each specialty in
medicine has its own examining board. In order to become a
diplomate of the American Board, one must first satisfy certain
training requirements. For example, in orthopaedic surgery,
one must serve, beyond the internship, three years devoted entirely to orthopaedic surgery. After the completion of this training, he must be in practice for five years and be ethically acceptable to his colleagues before he is eligible to take the Board examinations. If a doctor is a diplomate of the American Board of his
specialty, it is important that the jury be apprised of it.
An attorney should try to utilize the doctor other than as an
expert witness. If the attorney plans to take a deposition, for
example, it is desirable for his doctor to be present and listen to
the questions. Perhaps the doctor may suggest questions which
the opposing doctor should be asked. This might be a very important factor. The difficulty is, that doctors are busy and most of
them do not like to be bothered with this type of work. This is
understandable because it is time consuming. However, if it can
be arranged, this type of liaison can be extremely helpful to the
lawyer.
The attitude of the lawyer in cross-examining a physician is
important. An attorney with great trial experience once said, "In
cross-examination, do not examine crossly." That is a good rule
to follow. I know one gentleman, who, when he cross-examines,
bellows so loud that one can hear him far away. This conduct is
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unnecessary, and in the end, defeats its purpose. The asking of
intelligent questions in a normal tone of voice rather than the
shouting of less pertinent questions will accomplish much more.
The average lawyer should not attempt to cross-examine an
expert medical witness unless he has some knowledge of the field.
A lawyer cannot pit his knowledge of medicine against the doctor,
because the expert witness can trip the lawyer very easily. The
lawyer can only hope to discredit the expert witness if he is prone
to exaggerate testimony. For example, if the expert witness expresses an opinion which reveals that he did not adequately examine the patient or if he tends to digress into a field where he is
not familiar either by training or by experience, the alert lawyer
should immediately reveal such digressions.
One of the most important factors for the lawyer who is preparing a tort action for trial is to review the medical facts of the
case with the doctor. The lawyer should either go to the doctor's
office or perhaps to the doctor's home, as I have often had attorneys
do. The case should be thoroughly reviewed so that the attorney
understands the medical problems involved and learns something
about medical terminology as it relates to the particular problem.
The lawyer will then better understand how to cross-examine the
opposing doctor. If the lawyer fails to discuss the problem with
the doctor prior to the trial, he makes a serious mistake. The
attorney can study the subject himself, and some attorneys are
extremely clever in digesting medical terminology and problems.
I recollect a case before the State Compensation Insurance Fund
a few years ago, where I sat in amazement as I listened to a young
attorney cross-examine on a very difficult medical subject.
The attitude of the doctor on the witness stand is important.
The doctor should tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth. He should do his utmost to be impartial and fair-minded.
He should be natural. He should not talk down to the j'ury, or to
the lawyer, since this is unbecoming conduct. The doctor should
be modest and not exaggerate his qualifications, capacity or experience. He should not make a speech, nor volunteer information. He should listen to each question and be sure he understands
it before he answers. If he does not understand the question, he
should not hesitate to ask the lawyer to repeat it, because his answer might be extremely important in the decision that will be
given by the jury. Above all, he should not attempt to be an
advocate. He should only be a medical expert. He should not lose
his temper. Moreover, if the lawyer loses his temper and the doctor
does likewise, the case will most certainly be lost.
The medical facts should be presented to the jury in such
simple terminology that each and every member can understand
the problem in question. The ability to convey medical thoughts
in simple words should be cultivated by everyone interested in
medical jurisprudence. Instead of using polysyllabic or Latin
words, the expert medical witness should express himself in simple words that the jury can understand. It is similar to teaching.
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If one understands a subject, he can teach it. If he does not, he
has great difficulty in conveying ideas to the student. So it is with
addressing a jury. If the doctor really understands the problem,
he can inform the jury in simple terms so that the jury can understand them. I would like to quote from an article about a trial
in which a physician had testified to the results of a blow to the
plaintiff's abdomen. The judge interpreted the remarks as follows.
"Gentlemen of the jury, the doctor means to say that the plaintiff
was hit in the stomach." Everybody knows where the belly or
the stomach is, but perhaps everybody doesn't know where the
abdomen is located. The use of anatomical charts, if permissible,
may be helpful in conveying ideas to the jury. It is ofttimes more
impressive to an individual to see the location of a region on an
anatomical chart rather than try to paint a word picture.
Impartiality on the part of the attorney merits some consideration. It is understandable that there are instances when it
is difficult to be impartial, but one must continually ask himself
the question "Am I doing the right thing?" Lawyers must remember that they are officers of the court, and they should not resort
to tactics of the prize ring or a wrestling match, expecting the
judge to serve only as a referee. The lawyer's duty is to see that
justice is done and present the facts of the case.
I would like to ask lawyers to be more tolerant of doctors
in reference to rating a disability. The lawyer must realize that
we have no exact mathematical rules. Many factors are involved
and the human element is not the least important. A doctor's
experience, his impression of the patient, his interpretation of the
data revealed by physical examination, and the thoroughness of
the physical examination, all play a role in the final conclusion.
Interpretations can and do differ. The important point is that
the doctor's opinion should be truthful and impartial. The problem
of rating back cases, for example, has cast a shadow or doubt
against the medical profession in the minds of many lawyers.
However, if one stops to consider the myriad points involved in
reaching a conclusion, one can perhaps better understand discrepancies in estimating disability.
The medical reports to lawyers should be detailed but not
padded. By necessity they have to be couched in scientific terminology which, when required, can be interpreted verbally in simpler words to the lawyer. If the doctor includes any personal
remarks in his letter, such as the following which I encountered:
"we hope that our report will enable her to recover for her disability", the lawyer should request the doctor to delete such statements.
In conclusion, wide overlap of the functions of the doctor and
lawyer is noted in the field of medical jurisprudence. I would like
to make a plea for more cooperation between the two professions
for the ultimate good and welfare of the patient-client towards
the goal that justice may be done.
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FORMS COMMITTEE PRESENTS CHECK LIST
FOR FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING
LOANS INSURED OR GUARANTEED BY THE
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION OR
THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION*
Some loans have been insured or guaranteed by both FHA
(for conciseness Federal Housing Administration will be abbreviated to FHA, and Veterans Administration to VA), and VA. Sometimes you will foreclose the FHA first loan and sometimes the VA is
the first loan. All references to the other department will not apply
unless otherwise indicated in an appropriate footnote. The andresses for foreclosure purposes are:
(FHA)
State Director
Federal Housing Administration
555 New Customhouse
Denver, Colorado
(VA)
Loan Guaranty Division
Veterans Administration
Denver. Federal Center
Denver 12, Colorado
Proceedings to foreclose should be taken in the following
order:
1. As a preliminary to foreclosure, the mortgagee or its
servicing agent has already notified FHA by filing in duplicate
form 2068.' Then at the time the foreclosure is actually filed another form 2068, in duplicate, should be sent. No comparable procedure is necessary on a VA foreclosure.
* By Sub-Committee on District Court Forms, Royal C. Rubright, Chairman.
The parent committee is the Forms Standardization Committee of the Colorado
Bar Association, Donald M. Lesher, General Chairman.
For standard pleading samples to be used in foreclosure by the Public
Trustee, see 28 DICTA 461-473 and 29 DICTA 1-6; see also the excellent article by
Percy S. Morris, Foreclosure by Sale by Public Trustee of Deeds of Trust il
Colorado, 28 DICTA 437-459.
This present article is believed necessary because, in addition to the normal
procedures of foreclosure, there are certain technical requirements prescribed
by the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration governing foreclosure. The forms and procedures are contained in manuals and
regulations not readily available to the average practicing lawyer. The Forms
Committee hopes that the check list will guide readers through the complications so that a title will finally be accepted by the FHA and the VA. The article
does not attempt to repeat any of the statutory steps outlined in the former
DICTA articles, but it will give some practical hints and set forth an orderly
method of procedure.
The problems have been discussed with the FHA and VA and it is believed
that the steps outlined comply with their regualtions.
' Mortgagee's handbook published by the Federal Housing Administration
in Washington, D. C. issued July 1952, Sec. 1103, provides the first notice is to
be filed 60 days after default occurs which is 30 days after date the delinquent
payment is due. Each 60 days thereafter the mortgagee shall file another form
2068.
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2. Obtain Note and Trust Deed and abstract and make a
photostatic copy of
(a) The Note
(b) The Trust Deed
(c) Assignment of Rents, if any
(d) Assignment of the Trust Deed, if any.
(e) Statement of account showing the delinquency, the
date of delinquency, the monthly payments, the interest, the amount in the tax reserve, and the insurance reserve.
3. Prepare and file with the Public Trustee:
(a) Notice of Election and Demand (Two signed copies
for the Public Trustee, one for your file and one for
the lender). VA loan-one copy for VA. (VA copies
are necessary if you foreclose a VA first or if there
is a VA second trust deed).
(b) Copies of Notice of Public Trustee's Sale. Two copies
for Public Trustee, one to mail to each person having
recorded interest in title, one for your file, one for
lender (and one for VA-see 3 (a).
(c) $50.00 deposit check (current Denver amount).
(d) Original Note.
(e) Recorded original Trust Deed.
(f) Recorded Assignment.of Trust Deed, if one exists.
4. After Notice of Election and Demand has been recorded,
send abstract2to be brought to date to include the recorded Election
and Demand.
(a) Send Form 2068 to FHA (make four copies; one for
your file, one for the lender and two for the FHA).
(b) Send VA a copy of (1) Election and Demand, (2)
Notice of Public Trustee's Sale.3
5. Before delivering abstract, or stub-abstract to the Public
Trustee, compile list 4 of names and addresses of the original mortgagor, subsequent lienors and grantees,- and furnish the list to the
Public Trustee (three copies; two to Public Trustee, one for your
file).

I

Many of the newer properties do not have abstracts and the lender has
a Mortgagee's Title Policy. In this case, order a stub-abstract beginning with
the date of recording of the deed of trust you are foreclosing. It should include
all entries subsequent, to and including the Notice of Election and Demand.
Where abstract companies can furnish photographic entries, request them to
save yourself time in listing the addresses shown in the recorded documents,
and to avoid errors.
3 These are required by Section 36:4319 of the VA regulations.
4 28 DICTA p. 467. In this article reference will be made to the former DICTA
articles, rather than the statutes because the valuable explanatory statements
and suggestions in the articles help one to comply with the statutes.
I Attorneys often add their names to the list. The receipt of the Notice of
Sale reminds them to verify the fact that the mailing was made within 10 days
after first publication as required by Coto. STAT. ANN., C. 40, § 64 (1935); see 28
DICTA 448.
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6. File motion in District Court for an order for Public
Trustee's Sale.! Pay the docket fee. This is the proceeding under
Rule 120:
(a) Prepare Order for Hearingi (three copies-original
to file, one for VA, one for your file).
(b) Take along:
(1) Notices of Hearing Date," (original to file, one
for the Clerk to post in his office, one for VA, one
for your file, and one for mailing to each person having recorded interest in property). (The list will be
the same as in number 5 above).
(2) Stamped envelopes addressed to each person to
whom the notice is to be mailed by the Clerk of the
Court.
(3) Certificate of Mailing and Posting,' to be signed
by the Clerk of the Court (four copies, two for Clerk,
one for your file, one for VA).
(c) Mail VA:
(1) Motion for Order
(2) Order for Hearing
(3) Notice of Hearing Date
(4) Certificate of the Clerk of District Court showmailing and posting.'"

7. Check the newspaper to see that the Notice of Public
Trustee's publication is in the paper and that it is properly printed
and published for proper time."
8. Check with Public Trustee to be sure that Notices were
mailed 2by the Public Trustee within 10 days from the first publication.'
9. Prepare and have entered by the District Court the Order
authorizing Public Trustee's Sale.' 3 (Four copies, original to file.
one for the Public Trustee, one for VA and one for your file).
10. Attend Public Trustee's sale on date set. Check with
Public Trustee a day or two before to determine the Public
Trustee's costs and to inform the Public Trustee of any taxes paid,
court costs under the Rule 120 proceedings, water bill or other
items paid pursuant to the provisions of the Trust Deed. You will
thus establish the proper amount of your bid. It need not be paid
in cash since you are bidding as holder of note. If the costs incurred by Public Trustee exceed your cash deposit you must pay
that amount in cash at the sale. The Public Trustee normally pre6 28 DICTA 461.

'28
128
'28
1 28
1"28

DICTA 464.
DICTA 464.
DICTA 465.
DICTA 447.
DICTA 447.

28 DICTA 448.

"28

DICTA

469.

382
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pares the Certificate of Purchase, and gives you the original after
the sale. The Public Trustee records the duplicate within ten days
after the sale. 14 Send form 2068 in duplicate to FHA (one copy
for your file) ; send detailed statement of bid to VA (one copy for
your file, one to lender).
11. Prepare a Return of Sale and file with District Court.'(three copies; file original, one for VA and one for your file).
12. Prepare and have entered by District Court the Order
Approving Sale.'" (Four copies; file original, one for Public
Trustee, one for VA and one for your file).
13. When redemption period expires '- the Public Trustee
will ordinarily prepare the Public Trustee's Deed. It is to be hoped
that VA will redeem if you have foreclosed the FHA first Trust
Deed. In this event your worries are over. If redemption is not
made by VA, the Public Trustee's deed will issue to your client.
The procedure for collecting on the insurance or guaranty
when (a) only a FHA loan is foreclosed or (b) where only a GI
loan is foreclosed, is an administrative problem which your client
will normally handle without aid from you and the problems are
beyond the scope of this article. We therefore leave you proudly
and firmly grasping your perfect and indefeasible Public Trustee's
Deed as you walk into your client's office to collect your fee. As
you are now keenly aware-having followed all of the above steps
-you earned it! We only hope we have made the path a little
easier.
28 DICTA 454.
"28 DICTA 472.
"28 DICTA 472.
29 DICTA 457.

ATTENTION SUBSCRIBER!
As announced in the July issue, the 30 year subject-author
index to DICTA is ready for your use. The students and attorneys
who have compiled the information feel that this publication will
be an valuable aid in your library. This 85 page booklet, at a
printing cost to us of $2.00, is being made available to you as a
service of DICTA with no attempt to profit therefrom.
This order slip may be returned with the appropriate data.
We sincerely solicit your support.
Thank you,
V. G. Seavy, Jr., Managing Editor.
Enclosed please find two dollars ($2.00) for my copy of the
30 YEAR DICTA INDEX ] Will remit upon receipt of Index D
Name
Address
Please make check payable to the University of Denver
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THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE ADVERSE
WITNESSES AS A PART OF DUE PROCESS
IN HEARINGS BEFORE COLORADO
AGENCIES
DWIGHT A. HAMILTON*

INTRODUCTION

Many a lawyer has been shocked by a decision of an agency or
commission that is completely opposed to the jury-trial rules of
evidence as he has learned and applied them in a court of law. The
same attorney feels crucified when the Supreme Court upholds the
agency's ruling and condones the agency's act, announcing that
such action is fair and adequate procedure for agencies and commissions. The particular problem discussed in this article concerns
a vital feature of our law, and that is whether or not cross-examination of adverse witnesses in administrative hearings is a vital element in determining its fairness. This is controversial in nature
and unsettled, and it is not the purpose of this article to settle the
controversy. The purpose is, however, to discuss the law of Colorado pertaining to cross-examination of adverse witnesses in
agency proceedings as distinguished from the absolute right to
cross-examine under the jury-trial rules of evidence.
RULES OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

In recent years the quasi-judicial hearing before administrative agencies and officers has become an important, if not a basic,
part of the legal process. The courts have had to solve the new
problems arising from the multiplication of administrative agencies
without historical basis and systematic theory to guide them. Historically the common law rules of evidence arose from the process
of the jury trial and consequently apply to the jury-court only. In
Thayer's words, "Our Law of Evidence is concerned with the
operations of courts of justice; and not with ordinary inquiries
'in pais'."' Wigmore tells us that the history of the jury-trial rules
of evidence serve to warn us of the pitfalls in our path if these
rules are strictly applied to administrative tribunals. He states:
• . . any attempt to apply strictly the jury-trial rules of
evidence to an administrative tribunal acting without a
jury is an historical anomaly, predestined to probable
futility and failure.2
Applying these historical lessons, the popular view of the day
is best expressed by Wigmore in his treatise as follows:
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
mon

'Thayer, James Bradley, A Preliminzary Treatise on E''idenc'
Law, p. 270 (1898).
21 WiomouI: oN- EvrDEFNcI(,
31 (3rd ed. 1940).

(it the Corn-
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The popular view . . . is that jury-trial rules have
had their day in our system of justice; that their obstructive and irrational technicalities have made our
system nauseous and futile in its native habitat; and that
to transplant it to new fields would be an error amounting to folly. The opposite view is advocated by most courts and practicing
attorneys. They feel that the jury-trial rules of evidence are the
only safeguards we have to insure a fair method of investigation
in judicial or quasi-judicial hearings. Those who advocate this
view feel that these rules as developed are essential fundamentals
of a system of proof in a fair trial or hearing.
It is conceded by most practitioners, as a general rule, that
administrative agencies conducting hearings are not bound by the
strict or technical rules of evidence which are employed in jurytrials." This rule is being adopted by the courts in a compromising
attitude with the idea that the administrative tribunal need not
be limited by the jury-trial rules as long as somewhere in the
record there is sufficient evidence, legally acceptable by jury-trial
rules, to sustain the finding.
The state of the law in general is as it was at common law.
However, if a state statute in creating an agency declares that the
agency has the power to make its own rules of procedure, by implication any common law rule of evidence is of no effect. Some state
statutes specifically declare that an agency need not be bound by
the common law rules of evidence or by technical rules of evidence.
This clearly destroys any previously existing problem. These principals have been summarized in Corpus Juris Secundum. "
The rules of evidence are generally relaxed in administrative proceedings," and it is generally held, frequently by reason of statute, that the rules of evidence
applicable in a judicial proceeding are not binding or controlling in an administrative proceeding;7 but this does
not mean that the rules of evidence are abolished or abrogated I since the essential rules of evidence by which
rights are asserted or defended must be preserved in administrative proceedings," and under some statutes and
the rules and regulations of some administrative bodies,
the general rules of evidence applicable in judicial proceedings apply to administrative proceedings."'
The above quotation makes it clear that the laws are not uni3

Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 169 App. Div. 450, 155 N.Y.S. 1 (1915).

'1

WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,

39 (3rd ed. 1940).

573 ,.J.S. 441, Sec. 122.
1U. S.-N.LR.B. v. Lightner, 113 F. 2d 621.
Durkin v. A. H. Luecht & Co., 379 Ill. 227, 40 N. E. 2d, 67.
£ U. S.-N.L.R.B. v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., C.C.A. 5, 98 F. 2d 870.
'U. S.-Bridges v. Wixon, Cal., 326 U. S. 135, 65 S. Ct. 1443.
,0U. S.-Pittsburgh S. S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 180 F. 2d 731, affirmed 340 U. S. 498.
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form as created by the legislatures or applied by the courts, but
vary according to the kind of administrative agency and the surrounding circumstances.
THE OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT OR CROSS-EXAMINE

It is a general belief among lawyers that cross-examination is
the only safeguard for testing the truthfulness and value of human
statements. It has been said by many authorities that cross-examination is the greatest and most permanent contribution of the
Anglo-American system of law to the methods of trial procedure.
It is a fundamental test of truth and as such has been used and
praised by attorneys for generations. It is said in Corpus Juris,"1
A party has a right to cross-examine witnesses who
have testified for the adverse party, and this right is
absolute and not a mere privilege, and, unless subject to
cross-examination, a witness cannot testify, and it is not
within the discretion of the court to say whether or not
the right will be accorded.
It is apparent from this general statement that at common
law the cross-examination of an adverse witness was essential to
the elucidation of truth. Testimony that is offered cannot be admitted into evidence until an opportunity has been had for crossexamination.
An administrative hearing, particularly where the proceeding
is quasi-judicial, must be full, fair, and adequate. There must be
adequate notice of the issues and the issues must be clearly defined. All parties must be apprised of the evidence so that they
may explain or rebut it. Some courts say that they must be given
an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence,
including rebuttal evidence, and the administrative body must
decide on the basis of the evidence. In the case of Interstate Com-2
merce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company,'
the U. S. Supreme Court, after stating that the commission as an
administrative body is not bound by the strict rules of evidence
used in jury trials even where it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity,
continued as follows:
In such cases the Commissioners cannot act upon
their own information as could jurors in primitive days.
All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be given opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to
offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way
can a party maintain its rights or make its defense. In
no other way can it test the sufficiency of the facts to
support the finding; for otherwise, even though it appeared that the order was without evidence, the manifest
"70 C.J. 611, Sec. 779.
' 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185 (1913).
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deficiency could always be explained on the theory that
the Commission had before it extraneous, unknown, but
presumptively sufficient information to support the finding. (Emphasis added)
As a result of this decision, in order-that all hearings before
the Interstate Commerce Commission be full and fair, all parties
must be apprised of the evidence presented, given an opportunity
to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to present evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In Pennsylvania, in hearings before the
Public Utility Commission the same requirements are mandatory
for a fair hearing. The court said:
In no other way can a party maintain its right, or
make a defense, or13 test the sufficiency of the facts to
support the finding.
Further documentation for this rule is found in Automobile
Sales Co., Inc. v. Bowles, 14 where an action was brought to enjoin
the Office of Price Administratioa from carrying out a suspension
order revoking plaintiff's gasoline ration for a period of one year.
The court said:
The introduction of an accusing affidavit to form
the basis of proof of the truth of its contents, without
the right afforded to cross-examine the person purportedly making it, violates every known rule of evidence except in ex parte proceedings. Even the liberal rules recognized in administrative proceedings do not countenance
such proof.
Similar decisions have been rendered as to hearings before the
National Labor Relations Board, 15 and before zoning boards in the
state of Connecticut.' 6 These cases give a general application of
the right to cross-examine witnesses in administrative hearings in
the federal and state courts.
The specific problem in Colorado has seldom been attacked on
all fours. The Colorado Constitution has no article or provision
which specifically requires cross-examination in hearings before
Colorado administrative agencies. There is little statutory or case
law upon the subject. However, Colorado seems to fall among
those states which allow the administrative agencies or commissions to use their own prerogative in determining whether or not
to adopt the common law jury-trial rules of evidence. Whether or
not the agencies and courts should protect the fundamental right
to cross-examine witnesses is the major question. To determine
the answer, a synopsis of the statutes and decisions pertaining to
"In re Shenandoah Suburban Bus Lines Inc., 355 Pa. 521, 50 A. 2d 301
(1947)..
14 58 F.
Supp. 469 (Ohio, 1944).
N.L.R.B. v. Prettyman, 117 F. 2d 786, 6th Cir. (1941).
'GWadell
v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of New Haven, 136 Conn. 1.
68 A. 2d 152 (1949).
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a few of the Colorado administrative agencies and boards will be
helpful.
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

The statute which provides the rules of evidence and procedure to be followed in hearings before the State Industrial Commission is as follows:
Such commission or person by it duly designated,
shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory
rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of
procedure, other than as herein or by the rules of the
commission provided; but may make such investigations
in such manner as in its judgment are best calculated to
ascertain the substantial rights of17the parties to carry
out justly the spirit of this article.
Section 37 of the same chapter provides that in hearings before the Commission:
. . . either party shall have the right to be present at
any hearing in person or by attorney, or any other agent,
and to present such testimony as may be pertinent to the
controversy before the commission, and shall have the
right of cross-examination; provided, that the commission may with or without notice to either party cause testimony to be taken, or an inspection or investigation to be
made; the testimony so taken shall be reported to the
commission for its consideration upon final hearing. All
ex parte testimony taken by the commission shall be reduced to writing and either party shall have opportunity
to examine and rebut the same on final hearing .. 18
In the establishment of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the Colorado legislature provided for cross-examination of
adverse witnesses in hearings before that Commission :'9
All parties in interest shall have the right to be
present at any hearing, in person or by attorney or by
any other agent and to present such testimony as may be
pertinent to the controversy before the commission and
shall have the right to cross-examine.
After giving the commission the right to make examinations
without notice, the statute continues as follows:
All ex parte evidence received by the commission shall
be reduced to writing and any party in interest shall
have the opportunity to examine and rebut the same by
cross-examination or by further evidence.19
COLO. STAT. AiN., c. 97, Sec. 24 (1935).
"'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, Sec. 37 (1935).
" CoLO. STAT. A.N .. C. 97, Sec. 373 (1935).
'
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The.reported law in Colorado is very meager and inadequate.
No case seems to be decided on the exact point in question. In one
Colorado case the Industrial Commission concluded that the claimant had failed in four years to establish any error, mistake, or
change of condition so as to enable claimant to show greater disability than originally determined. Then without an additional
hearing or evidence, the Commission awarded additional compensation on the ground of a change in condition. This was held to be
error and was reversed. It is clear that to allow the second award
would have deprived the employer the right to explain or rebut
the new evidence20 and the right of cross-examining the declarant
of said evidence.
Another and more recent Colorado case indirectly implies that
there is a right to cross-examine witnesses in Workmen's Compensation cases. In this case a written report of the employer's doctor
was not made a part of the case by formal order, because of a
statement of the employer's representative to the referee that they
wished to present the doctor for oral examination at a hearing to
be held in Denver, which they did not do. Claimant's counsel had
already waived cross-examination of the doctor and introduction of
the doctor's report had in fact been consented to. Any proper objection to its consideration had been waived, and it could be considered by
the commission, even though not formally offered into
2
evidence. 1
There must be a right of cross-examination before it can be
waived. The case therefore implies that the statute establishes a
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and that this claimant
waived that right. If such reasoning is followed the statute is
properly applied.
With respect to proceedings before the Commission, sections
24, 37 and 373 of the statute, as quoted above, give the Commission
a free reign in making its investigations and conducting its hearings. The technicalities of the common law are abolished, but it is
clear that the legislature did not intend to discard all safeguards.
Cross-examination of adverse witnesses, one of the most important
safeguards, is protected except in the case of certain ex parte
evidence which the Commission is given the power to obtain. In
such a case the right to cross-examine witnesses is not guaranteed,
but its use is advocated if possible. If it is not possible, the party
interested is entitled to examine the evidence and is given a right to
explain or rebut and the spirit of fair play is kept intact. The cases
cited, although not on all fours with the problem, bear out this
theory by implication.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

Following the popular rule, the Legislature provided that the
0AIlan v. Gadbois, 100 Colo. 141, 66 P. 2d 331 (1937).
Ward & Co. v. Industrial Commission,
2d 52.
21 Montgomery

...

Colo .....

263 P.
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Public Utilities Commission would not be bound by the technical
jury-trial rules of evidence in its hearings. 22 Statutory authority
to cross-examine witnesses is established for all interested parties
participating in a hearing before said commission. The section
states:
At the time fixed for any hearing before the commission, any commissioner or an examiner, or, at the
time to which the same may have been continued, the applicant, petitioner, complainant, the person, firm, or corporation complained of, such person, firms, or corporations as the commission may allow to interview, and
such persons, firms, or corporations as will be interested
in or affected by any order that may be made by the commission in such proceedings shall be entitled to be heard,
examine
and cross-examine witnesses, and introduce evi23
dence.
Contra to the statute controlling hearings before the Industrial Commission, 24 the above quoted statute contains no retained
right of reasonable cross-examination, with a concurrent right to
explain or rebut if cross-examination is impossible, in cases where
the commission makes examinations and investigations without
notice and uses the ex parte evidence adduced as a result of said
investigation.
By a strict interpretation of the statute, the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses is an absolute right and to deny an
interested party this right would be to deny him a fair hearing.
In all its hearings, the commission must act strictly within the
authority conferred upon it by statute and must do so in a lawful
manner. 25 Generally speaking, a hearing before the Commission
may be regarded as an administrative investigation, the purpose
being to make findings of fact. Such a hearing must be fair and
open, with suitable opportunity being given to object to evidence
offered, to cross-examine witnesses, and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. 26 Again, there is a dearth of support from decisions by the Colorado Supreme Court. However, in Snell v. The
Public Utilities Commission 27 the Court indirectly protected the
right to cross-examine witnesses and explain and rebut evidence
by reversing the order of the Commission, which modified a previous order. The carrier applied to the Commission for a permit
to operate sight-seeing buses and cars from Colorado Springs to
Stead's Ranch in Rocky Mountain National Park. The permit was
originally granted with no limitation to the number of vehicles to
be used. A petition for rehearing was denied but in the order
STAT. ANN., c.
COLO. STAT. ANN., C.
'4 COLO. STAT. ANN., C.

137, Sec. 38 (193:5).
137, Sec. 46 (1935).
97, Sections 37 and 373 (1935).
1Snell v. Public Utilities Commission, 108 Colo. 162, 114 P. 2d 563 (1941)
2 In re Shenandoah Suburban Bus Lines, supra note 13.
1 Snell v. Public Utilities Commission, supra note 25.
'
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denying a rehearing the Commission modified its first order. On
appeal, the Court in reversing the modified order held as follows:
It is elementary that a public utility commission derives its authority wholly from constitutional or statutory provisions, and possesses only such powers as are
thereby conferred. Thus, it is certain, under the facts
alleged here, that the commission was without authority
to amend or modify the original order, as was essayed,
as a part of its action in passing upon the application for
the rehearing sought.
It is apparent that the Commission was changing its mind
without granting a rehearing. The aggrieved party should have
been granted a further hearing. The Court indicates that the Commission must strictly follow the statutory provisions which govern
its hearings. In rehearings, the interested parties are entitled to
be heard and to examine and cross-examine witnesses, just as in
the original hearings.28 1 The substantive issues were not discussed
in the opinion.
The State Railroad Commission, referred to in COLO. STAT.
ANN., c. 29 Sec. 11 (1935), was replaced by the Public Utilities
Commission in 1913. The powers formerly exercised by the Railroad
Commission are now exercised by the Public Utilities Commission.
As a result, the statutes concerning hearings before the Public Utilities Commission apply to the railroads. In a rate making case, Denver & Salt Lake R.R. Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co.- 9
the statutory provision granting the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses was applied and upheld. The case dealt with a
petition to review an order of the Public Utilities Commission
fixing an apportionment of through rates on coal to be shipped
from points in northwestern Colorado on the road of the petitioner
to points in eastern Colorado on the road of the respondent. In
the hearing documentary evidence was introduced after the arguments and the Commission admitted it into evidence and examined
and used it in its decision. The aggrieved party's counsel objected
as no opportunity was given to produce evidence, to explain or
to rebut. They were also denied the right to cross-examine the
author of the evidence used against them. This was a denial of a
fair hearing as required under due process. The Colorado Supreme
Court cited I.C.C. v. L. & N. R. R. Co. 30 as a case to sustain the objection. It is a case in which it was sought to sustain an order
of the Commission on the basis of secret evidence, that is information gathered outside of the hearing. The Court said:
The more liberal the practice in admitting testimony,
SCOLO. STAT. ANN., C. 137, Sec. 38 (1935).
- Denver and Salt Lake R. R. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 64 Colo. 229,
171 P. 74 (1918).
" Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227
U. S. 88, (1913); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831 (1927).
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the more imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules of evidence by which rights are asserted or
defended. In such cases the commissioners cannot act,
upon their own information, as could jurors in primitive
days. All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence
submitted or to be considered, and must be given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal.
In no other way can a party maintain its rights or make
its defense. In no other way can it test the facts, for
otherwise even though it appeared that the order was
without evidence, the manifest deficiency could always
be explained on the theory that the commission had before it extraneous, unknown but presumptively sufficient
information to support the finding.
This well-reasoned opinion is excellent and the Colorado
Supreme Court could well afford to cite it as its authority. It
clearly summarizes the law as it should be in all jurisdictions and
as it is in hearings before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission.
LICENSING BOARDS FOR THE PROFESSIONS

There is no statutory right to cross-examine witnesses by persons brought before the Board of Medical Examiners, the Board
of Nurse Examiners, or the Board of Veterinary Examiners in
hearings brought to revoke or refuse a license to practice. Nor
is any right to cross-examine preserved by the Dental Practice Act
in hearings before the Board of Dental Examiners.
The Board of Medical Examiners, when a complaint is filed
against one holding a license to practice medicine or one applying
for such license, must serve a copy upon the person accused. The
statute goes on and says that it must be filed...
.. . together with a notice of the time and place of the
hearing thereon, advising him that he may be present
in person, and have counsel if he so desires, to offer evidence and be heard in his defense . . . the board shall
receive evidence upon the subject under consideration and
shall accord the person against whom charges are preferred a full and fair opportunity to be heard in his defense and shall adopt a resolution31 finding him guilty or
not guilty of the matters charged.
No statement is made about the rules of evidence and nothing
said about the requirements for a fair hearing. The requirements
for hearings to withhold or revoke nurses licenses are very similar.
That statute says:
...
before any license shall be revoked the holder thereof
shall be entitled to at least thirty days notice in writing
of the charge against him or her, and of the time and
'COLO.

STAr. AN.., C. 109, Sec. 33 (18)

(1935).
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place of the hearing of such charge against him or her,
at which
time and place he or she shall be entitled to be
32
heard.
The requirements for a fair hearing.before the Board of Nurse
Examiners do not establish cross-examination of adverse witnesses
as a basic right.
The Dental Practice Law 33 and the act creating the State
Board of Veterinary Medicine 34 provide fairer standards for hearings than the acts above mentioned, although no specfiic right to
cross-examine witnesses is established. The statutes provide:
Mere technicalities shall be disregarded and the
board shall not be bound by rules of evidence or rules of
procedure applicable to courts of law.
Little or no case law can be found determining a person's
rights under these statutes. However, in proceedings before a
board to revoke a license or certificate of a physician, dentist or
nurse, in other states with statutes similar to the ones adopted in
Colorado, the holder must be given an opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses who testify against him.
In a Michigan case involving the revocation of a license to
practice medicine, the Supreme Court of Michigan said,
Unless the right is waived, the person charged is at
least entitled to:
1. Notice of a trial and place of hearing.
2. A hearing before a properly authorized body.
3. A reasonably definite statement of the charge or
charges preferred against the accused.
4. The right to cross-examine the witnesses who testify
against him.
5. The right to produce witnesses in his own behalf.
6. A full consideration and a fair determination according to the evidence of the controversy
by the body
35
before whom the hearing is had.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in reviewing an action by the
State Board of Health involving a license to practice medicine said:
• . . if such license is cancelled by a board of health, it
must be upon proper charges, with opportunity to appear and defend by the introducing of evidence and the
cross-examination of
those witnesses who testify against
38
him at the hearing.
A Massachusetts case held that physicians charged with professional misconduct are entitled to make reasonable cross-examc. 114, Sec. 6 (1935).
C. 52, Sec. 14 (1935).
C. 171, Sec. 13 (1935).
- Hanson v. Michigan State Board of Registration in Medicine, 253 Mich.
601, 236 N. W. 225 (1931).
31 Mathews v. Hedlund, 82 Nebr. 825, 119 N. W. 17 (1908).
STAT. ANN.,
' CoLO. STAT. ANN.,
4CoLO.
STAT. ANN.,

*'COLO.
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ination of witnesses making accusations.
Since there are no Colorado cases in point, it is perhaps correct to speculate that these
cases would be authority in 'applying our statutes to the case at
hand in order to insure a fair hearing.
In the Colorado case of McKay v. State Board of Medical Ex8
aminers,"
the Court held that a case to be appealed on certiorari to
the Supreme Court must raise a question of whether or not the
medical examiners regularly pursued their authority or greatly
abused their discretion. The same test applies to determining the
power of the district court to review decisions of the medical examiners and related boards.3 9 Whether or not the decision on the
merits is wrong is not within the issue. 40 Whether or not a denial
to cross-examine witnesses under the statutes is action beyond the
board's authority or an abuse of discretion has not been litigated.
The court could well seize upon such a denial and with good reasoning conclude that it is an abuse of discretion. It is the opinion of
the writer that the court would say, and rightly so, that the right
to cross-examine adverse witnesses before such a board is an important safeguard and is necessary to insure a fair investigation
into the merits of the charge for which revocation of the license
is asked:
The same test was applied in a case in which the State Board
of Dental Examiners revoked a license to practice dentistry. The
Court, in speaking of the scope of review by certiorari, held that the
inquiry should be limited to whether "jurisdiction has been exceeded, discretion abused, or authority regularly pursued". The
same rule applies in cases before the Board of Nurse Examiners
in that the court may review the evidence only to determine whether
an abuse of discretion has been committed by the board. 41 In this
case, Hohn v. State Board of Nurse Examiners,42 the trial court's
decision was affirmed. No mention was made in the opinion, the
record, or the briefs of a denial of cross-examination of adverse
witnesses. It does not appear whether or not cross-examination
was allowed by the Board at the hearing. But from the opinion, it
can be implied that the Court would look at the testimony and the
facts to see if the hearing was full and fair when it said,
Under the strict rule concerning certiorari, we are
permitted to determine whether or not the board abused
ts discretion. How can we make such determination without considering the testimony and the facts before the
Board, together with the charges made? Unless we are
3Ott v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 276 Mass. 566, 177 N. E. 542.
U McKay v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 103 Colo. 305,
86 P 2d 232
(1938).
,Dilliard v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 69 Colo. 575, 196 P. 866
(1921).
0 State Board of Medical Examiners v. Noble, 65 Colo. 410, 177 P. 141 (1918).
4' Hohu v. State Board of Nurse Examiners .-..
Colo- ------ _ P. 2d .... (1954).
1953-43 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10, p ......
'
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free to make such determination from the recorded testimony and facts, there would be no occasion for any review of any acts of a Board with statutory power only.
Courts are not to be impotent, stand idly by and allow
unrestricted exercise of authority by Boards, not granted
by statute, or permit
the arbitrary and unjustified exer43
cise of discretion.
This opinion makes it clear that the Court will protect and
uphold the rights of a party before any administrative board. To
feature a court allowing an agency to conduct a hearing without
permitting the parties to cross-examine adverse witnesses is beyond
reason. Further, assuming that the right to cross-examine is justified, the nurse was denied the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses who were absent from the hearing and, as a result, the board
members did not have an opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses so as to satisfy themselves in their own mind as to
the credibility of the witnesses. The theory was not brought out in
the briefs or in the Court's opinion, but it is clearly an underlying
fact of some importance and possibility.
CONCLUSION

The constitutional requirements for a fair hearing are limited
to the sections requiring due process of law.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states,
... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Article II, Section 25 of the Constitution of Colorado is similar
to the Fourteenth Amendment. It provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Due process implies that every individual shall have adequate
notice, and an opportunity to be heard and defend his rights. 44
It is generally required that hearings to be valid must be fair and
open. 4 - Due process also requires that an opportunity be given to
know the claims of the opposing party and t- explain or rebut
these claims.46 These are the requirements for due process that are
generally applied. However, most enlightened courts require that
the parties be given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who
testify against them.4 7 Due process also requires, among other
43Ibid.

:' In re Dlph, 17 Colo. 35, 28 P. 470.
4'Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773.
"English v. city of Long Beach, 35 Cal. 2d 155, 217 P. 2d 22.

17N.L.R.B. v. Prettyman, supra note 15; In re Shenandoah Bus Lines, supra
notes 13 and 26.
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things, that there be a finding in accord with some substantial evidence.' s It appears from the authorities cited that cross-examination is not always a legal requisite for a fair hearing. The reasons
given to uphold the denial of the right to cross-examine seem rather
empty alongside the reasons given in support of the right. It seems
to be clear to most practicing attorneys and to many courts that
cross-examination of adverse witnesses is essential in obtaining
the truth. In Colorado the law is not clear. As shown above, many
of the statutes require cross-examination of adverse witnesses in
hearings before the agency to which the statute appertains. Other
statutes seem to leave it to the agencies to grant or deny the right
to cross-examine witnesses at its own discretion. Examples of such
statutes are those that do nothing more than grant the person the
right to be heard at a full and fair hearing. Other statutes are a
little more explicit and say that the board will not be bound by
technical rules of evidence or procedure.
The decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court are just as confusing when it comes to a general rule of law. In a few cases, the
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses has been upheld as a requirement for a fair hearing. All too often the issue appears to
have been dodged and the cases decided upon another point. Perhaps the attorneys involved have been afraid to raise the issue,
being fearful of the result. It appears to the writer that their fears
are not supported because the trend seems to be that a denial of
the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is a flagrant abuse of
discretion which the court would not tolerate if brought to its attention. A recent Colorado case supports this theory where the
court held that due process had been preserved in a case where the
injured party was represented by counsel
and given an opportunity
49
to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
The question is always asked, "Should any changes be made
in the law?" The answer to this question is, "Yes". The writer
feels that hearings before all administrative agencies should be
uniform. The list of administrative agencies is growing continually.
More and more litigation is being brought before the bodies already existing. The confusion that exists today for party and
counsel alike, not to speak of the members of the agencies, is tremendous. Consequently, the need for clarity and uniformity becomes very clear. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act ;'"
was adopted to assure all that the administration of government
through administrative agencies be conducted according to established procedures, which adequately protect private interests and
settle disputes in accordance with the law and evidence.51 Section
s Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. U. S., 21 Supp. 83; State Civil Service
Commission v. Hazldtt, 119 Colo. 172, 201 P. 2d 610 (1948); Stork Restaurant,
Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 26 N. E. 2d 247 (1940) ; C. S. Card Iron Works Co.
v.. Radovich, 94 Colo. 426, 30 P. 2d 1108 (1933).
" School District v. Thompson, 121 Colo. 275, 214 P. 2d 1020 (1950).
m'60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. 1001.
:' GEILLHORN, WV.\
.ER, Arno IN sraTR.vTIV LAw, House Committee Report, p. 1086.
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7(c) of the Act requires that,
Every party shall have the right to present his case or
defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination
as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the
facts.
This provision does not confer a right of unlimited crossexamination. The burden is put upon the presiding member of
the agency to determine what is reasonable and what is required
for a "full and true disclosure of the facts". The writer feels that
this provision is not strong enough and leaves too much discretion
in the hands of the presiding officer. The way is open for an abuse
of discretion by the presiding officer and the chances for a successful appeal are great. The fact remains, however, that the law
for all federal agencies is uniform and the right of reasonable crossexamination is provided for all, and an arbitrary denial of the right
to reasonably cross-examine adverse witnesses would be grounds
for reversal under the act.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act was approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws. The act has been adopted in some form in Wisconsin, North
Dakota, North Carolina, Ohio and California. In the model act
there is no limit upon the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses
as in the federal act, and for this reason is superior. Section 9 (c)
of the Model Act provides:
Every party shall have the right of cross-examinaand shall have the right to
tion of witnesses who testify,
52
submit rebuttal evidence.
This is the law as it should be. Administrative agencies should
be required to follow this rule in every hearing. It is the opinion
of the writer that this model act should be adopted by every state
legislature in order to have full and fair hearings as required by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cross- examination is essential in administrative quasi-iudicial hearings, if the
truth is to be elucidated, for it is by far the best safeguard yet
found for testing the truthfulness and value of human statements.
Our legislatures and courts must continue to protect this essential
right if the requirements for a full and fair hearing are to be maintained. There is no better way to do so than by adopting the model
act. If this seems impractical, every staute governing procedures
of administrative hearings should contain a section requiring that
all parties be given the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses
who testify against them. This would be a great step in the march
toward the goal of fair and full administrative hearings for all.
"-Gellhorn, op. cit. note 51, Model State Administrative
ni. 1122.

Procedure Act,
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONTRACTS: A CONTRACT MAY NOT BE RESCINDED IN
VIOLATION OF ITS TERMS-The facts in Carleno Coal Sales,
Inc. v. Ramsey Coal Company 1 are simple. The defendant coal
producer entered a written contract under which the plaintiff sales
company was to have an exclusive distributorship of all coal produced by the defendant. The contract was to continue for five
years with an option for the plaintiff to renew the contract for an
additional five years. The dispute in the case arose over a clause
in the contract providing for cancellation of the contract for failure
or breach by one of the parties. The provision stated that in such
event "the party not at fault may give the defaulting party 60
days' written notice" of intent to cancel because of such breach.
The party notified would then have 60 days to correct Such default
or breach in order to avoid cancellation of the contract.
In trial to the court there was ample evidence that the plaintiff failed to perform his obligations under the contract. The defendant, without following the above-mentioned provision for cancellation, simply wrote the plaintiff that the agency was terminated
as of that time, and he then began sales to other companies. The
plaintiff sued for damages arising from the breach of contract.
There are really two issues presented by this case. The first
is one of interpretation of the contract; when the provision for
cancellation said "may", did it really mean "shall" or "must". The
second issue is a question of law; may an agency which has been
created to continue over a definite term be revoked for good cause,
but contrary to the terms of contract providing for revocation,
without subjecting the revoking party to liability for such a
breach?
Problems of construction of an instrument are usally troublesome. In this case the trial court held that the word "may" was
used in a simple permissive sense and that the provision therefore
merely provided one method by which alleged breaches or defaults
might be ironed out. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed this
interpretation on appeal, holding that "may" meant "shall" or
"must" for the reason that if the method of notice outlined in the
provision were merely optional, it created no rights or duties and
was, therefore, without purpose and "mere surplusage." The court
reasoned that unless the procedure were to be obligatory, its recital added nothing to the contract and such an interpretation would
violate the presumption that "each part of a contract has a purpose, and a construction which gives legal effect to every part
thereof . . ." The ultimate significance of this part of the case is
a lesson for those drafting contracts not to use the word "may"
I ---Colo ......
270

P. 2d 755, 1953-4 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 14, p. 321.
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when they mean "must." This case represents a rather expensive
cure for ambiguous drafting.
The second issue in this case involves more nearly a question
of pure law. The confusion evolves primarily from the attempt to
transform a well-settled rule in agency law into a principle of contract law which rests on entirely separate considerations. It is
well settled that the courts willnot enforce an agency relationship
(which is essentially a fiduciary one) over the protest of either
party irrespective of the original duration envisaged. Phrased a
little differentlyAn agency created for a definite term may nevertheless be rightfully revoked before its scheduled date of
expiration, without liability on the part of the principal,
where the agent2 fails to perform faithfully his express or
implied duties.
While the above rule is unquestionably good agency law, it in
no way abridges the rights of contracting parties to render themselves liable for failure to follow any specified procedure stipulated
to be binding on the parties. In this case the liability of the defendant in no way rested on the agency relationship, but was based
entirely on a contractual agreement. as to measures to be followed
in the event that the agency relation were to be terminated. The
Court cited American Jurisprudence for a statement of the rule
by a
that the right to cancel an agency contract may be restricted
3
stipulation in the contract creating the agency relationship. With
this contract law in mind, perhaps the agency rule could be clarified by a statement to the effect that a mere stipulation that an
agency contract is to continue over a stated term does not subject
the parties to liability in the event it is revoked prematurely for
good cause. Such liability may, however, be fixed by the contract
creating the agency. The ultimate lesson evolving from this dispute is that in determining possible liability in an anticipated
breach, the party should look carefully to both the laws of agency
and the laws of contract.
J. BELKNAP

DAMAGES-A WIFE CANNOT RECOVER IN A TORT ACTION FOR LOSS OF SUPPORT BY HER HUSBAND-The
answer to the question of a wife's right to a cause of action for
loss due to injuries resulting to her husband through the negligence of a third party has been reiterated and perhaps extended
in the case of Weng v. Scheiger.' In this case the plaintiff, her son
and! her husband were passengers in an automobile which was
struck from behind by the defendant's truck. There was little
doubt that the accident was caused by the carelessness of the driver
-2 c.i.s. 1157.
'AMtERICAN JIRISPRUDENCE 45, § 49.
'..
Colo.. , 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Slh.

No. 17, p. 443.
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of the truck. In an amended complaint the husband did not participate as a plaintiff, but his wife alleged that he was permanently
injured as a result of which she lost his support and companionship to her damage in the sum of $50,000. She also alleged
damages due to injuries to herself in the sum of $50,000. The jury
awarded $8,000 to the plaintiff in its verdict.
Over objection, the trial court submitted a special interrogatory to the jury directed to a finding of a separate amount for the
loss of support of plaintiff's husband. The interrogatory was returned without answer and upon question the foreman of the jury
stated that no damages were found for loss of support. The
Supreme Court held that the question was improperly before the
court and jury and that the error was aggravated by the submission of the special interrogatory to the jury which emphasized the
question which easily could have been reflected in an excessive
verdict. The errors were not cured by a failure on the part of the
jury to answer the interrogatory or make a finding as to such
damages, and because of these errors and others, the case was reversed and sent back for new trial.
Since the case of Giggey v. Galagher Transportation Company 2 the Colorado courts have recognized the rule that a wife
cannot recover for the loss of consortium of her husband because
of injuries resulting from the negligence of a third party. In that
case the husband recovered and the Court said that his recovery
precluded a double recovery for the same injury or wrong in an
action by the wife. In the present case, however, the husband made
no claim to recover so that the theory of double recovery is inapplicable. The plaintiff argued that support, meaning monetary
remuneration, is not recognized as a part of consortium by standard definitions 3 and accordingly cannot be inferred.
In the case of Franzen v. Zimmerman 4 the Supreme Court
affirmed a dismissal of a complaint which alleged that, "Because of
the negligence of defendant, plaintiff was deprived of the society,
companionship, services and support of her husband to her damage." The Court seeme4 to base that decision on the ground that
as no right of action existed in favor of married women under the
common law, it cannot now be claimed in the absence of a legislative grant. The plaintiff in the present case insisted that Franzen
v. Zimmerman did not settle the question of support alone. If the
question was not then settled, it seems clearly and distinctly established in the present case that the wife has no right of action
for loss of consortium or support even where the husband realizes
no such recovery for that loss.
Persons sympathetic with the idea of equality of spouses before the law will realize that in this decision the Colorado Court
2101 Colo. 258, 72 P. 2d 1100 (1937).
' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,

THIRD ED., p. 408; WORDS AND PHRASES. THIRD

SERiEs, p. 349.
'127 Colo. 381, 256 P. 2d 897 (1953).
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follows the great weight of authority which sustains the husband's
right to recover for loss due to the negligent injury to his wife,
but denies the wife a corresponding right in case of injury to her
husband.
JOHN PHILLIP LINN
TAXATION: INCOME FROM SOURCES WITHIN THE STATE
-The case of Arvey Corporationv. C. P. Fugate I arose as a result
of a previous action by the Arvey Corporation against the Julius
Hyman and Company.2 In that action, just as here, the Arvey Corporation sued on its own behalf and the behalf of its division
Velsicol Corporation.
The action out of which the instant case arose :3was an action
primarily to enjoin and restrain the manufacture and selling of
insecticides, and to require the defendants to account to the plaintiff for gains and profits resulting from the manufacture and sale
of such insecticides. Hyman was a vice-president and director
until February, 1947. Through his contractual obligations, Hyman
was to assign to Velsicol any invention or discovery made while so
employed. Differences arose which were not resolved and as a
result, Hyman resigned. A new Delaware Corporation was formed,
which was authorized to do business in Colorado and in February
of 1947 it began to manufacture insecticides in Colorado.
Upon trial in the District Court of the City and County of
Denver, an injunction was issued which determined that Velsicol
was entitled to recover from Hyman and Company all of the gains
and profits from the production and sale of Chlordane for the accounting period ended March 31, 1949.
Hyman and Company appealed and the trial court was affirmed.4 Shortly thereafter, the Director of Revenue of the State
of Colorado made a determination of tax liability against Velsicol
on the theory that the recovery in the prior case was income taxable under the laws of the State of Colorado. Velsicol filed its complaint against the Director of Revenue as an appeal from the final
determination of the deficiency income tax assessment in the district court of the City and County of Denver. The result of that
action is the subjdct of the present appeal.
The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the decision of the
trial court in assessing the tax against Velsicol. The assessment
was made pursuant to COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 84A, § 3 (1935) which
is as follows:
Upon corporations, except those corporations described
in section 6 of this section, there shall be levied and collected and paid for each taxable year, a tax at the rate provided-in sub-section (2) of this section upon the net income
Director of Revenue of the State of Colorado.
-123 Colo. 562, 233 P. 2d 977 (1951).
3Ibid.
1

* Ibid.
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of every corporation derived from sources within this
state on or after the effective date of this Act. Income
from sources within this state includes income from tangible or intangible properties located or having a situs
in this state and income from any activities carried on in
this state, regardless of whether carried on intrastate,
interstate, or foreign commerce.
The Court states: "The precise question presented is whether
or not the monies received by Velsicol from the judgment, including the profit made by Hyman and Company, constitute 'income
derived from sources within this state' and as such is it subject
to tax ?" Velsicol contends that since it never was domiciled in the
State of Colorado, never had an office or representative here, and
has never carried on business in this state, it therefore never derived any income from sources within the State under the above
Act. It further contends that the situs of its right being an intangible, was at the place of domicile of the owner.
The Court answers Velsicol's first contention by holding that
the phrase "sources within this state" is all-inclusive and without
any limitation. It is not confined to business activities carried on
in this state, but rather covers any and all sources.
As to Velsicol's second contention, the Court states: "In the
matter of assessment as applied in income taxation, there appears
to be a business situs of intangibles which may be separate and
distinct from the domicile of the owner."
The monies recovered by Velsicol were admitted to be income.
If it were recovery of damages then it would not have been income
and would not have been taxable. The court states: "This admission is made by way of insisting that the real question here involved is one of jurisdiction to tax." In the last analysis, the
question seems rather simple, in that Velsicol is precluded by an
adjudication that the monies it received was income; that such
income constituted the profits from the operation of a Colorado
corporation, and therefore the source of the income was confined
strictly to Colorado.
Finally, it is held that Velsicol cannot accept the profits from
sources within the state and then rely on its status as a foreign
corporation to evade the tax thereon. Velsicol had stepped into the
shoes of Hyman and Company. For the reasons above stated the
trial court was affirmed.
In affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court cites only one
case and distinguishes it. The case does not change the law as it
stands, but rather it extends the definition of the words of the
statute, "income from sources within the state". The case cited by
the Court is Cruse v. Clam and Coupling Company,5 which was
held not to be in point because of the difference of the 1937 statute,
as amended in 1943.
5113, Colo. 254, 156 P. 2d 397.
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The holding in this case may be rationalized solely on the
statute involved. The statute is found at section 2 (b) (1) chapter
196, page 453, S. L. 1951.0 The pertinent words therein are "income of every corporation derived from sources within this state."
The fact situation under which this case arose is such that it fits
the statute perfectly. Assume for a moment that Velsicol had not
had any action against Hyman and Company. In such a case, there
can be no doubt that Hyman and Company would be liable for the
tax under the statute. The source of that income, gain, or profit
was from sources within this state and clearly Hyman and Company would be liable therefor.
Now let us substitute Velsicol in place of Hyman and Company. By so doing, we are doing exactly what the lower court did
in allowing Velsicol to recover the gains and profits of Hyman and
Company. It should be noted that Velsicol has admitted that its
recovery was of gains and profits, or in the words of the statute,
the net income, of Hyman and Company. Velsicol, as the opinion
states, stepped into the shoes of Hyman and Company. By so doing, it subjects itself to liability for the corporation income tax.
The Court, by holding the phrase in question, all inclusive, has
precluded a corporation from successfully maintaining that since
it has conducted no business in Colorado it is not subject to income tax, if the income received was actually derived from a source
within the state. A source may apparently be any source from
which it is possible to derive income. If a foreign corporation
should recover income because of a right it holds against a Colorado Corporation it subjects itself to taxation. As above stated,
the holding seems entirely within the purview of the statute. It
also apears to be within the intent of the Legislature, as the rewording of the statute between the time of the Cruse case and the
instant case seems to indicate. The phrase was changed from
"business conducted within the state" to "sources within this
state". In merely comparing the two statutes and noting the
changes made, the legislative intent is clear. That intent was given
effect in the instant case.
GERALD F. GROSWOLD
'COLO.

STAT. ANN., C. 84A § 3 (1935).
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